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Abstract
We study the economic implications of regional favoritism, a form of distributive pol-
itics that redistributes resources spatially within countries. We use a large sample of
enterprise surveys spanning across many low and middle income countries, and utilize
transitions of national political leaders for identification. We document strong evidence
of regional favoritism among firms located in close vicinity to leader’s birthplaces but
not in other regions, nor in home regions before leader’s rise to power. Firms in favored
regions become substantially larger in sales and employment, and also produce more
output per worker, pay higher wages and, more generally, have higher total factor pro-
ductivity. Furthermore, evidence from several mechanisms suggests that leaders divert
public resources into their home regions by generating higher demand for firms operat-
ing in non-tradable sectors. A simple structural model of resource misallocation that is
calibrated to match our empirical estimates implies that favoritism generates aggregate
output loss of 0.5% annually.
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1 Introduction
Regional favoritism, the redistribution of resources spatially within countries, is a large phe-
nomenon observed in many parts of the world (Hodler and Raschky 2014). Economists have
for a long time studied the question of whether and, if so, how distributive politics, including
political and in particular regional favoritism, lead to distortionary economic policies (Golden
and Min 2013). The literature has hypothesized that lower income and less democratic
countries chronically suffer from various types of distortive policies which presumably lead to
widening the gap in the incomes of high and low income countries.
Our aim is to shed light on the question of whether regional favoritism is a policy failure
that will necessarily lead to further diverging economic outcomes, or whether it can be thought
of as a type of industrial policy that may potentially improve economic outcomes. To answer
this question, we study whether regional favoritism has implications on firm performance. We
remain agnostic on the normative mechanisms of favoritism at play. On one hand, favoritism
will likely diminish welfare if leaders misallocate the factors of production to unproductive
firms and regions, for example, due to political connections and corrupt motives. On the other
hand, favoritism can improve welfare if leaders can, for example due to their informational
advantages, provide at least a selected set of productive firms and regions the push necessary
to grow, become more productive and enter international markets.
We study this trade-off using data of at most 125 thousand enterprises spanning across
120 low and middle income countries and by utilizing transitions of national political leaders for
identification (see the geography of the firms and leaders in Figure 1). Our first contribution is
to document the existence of strong regional favoritism in firm outcomes. Firms located in the
home regions of current political leaders are larger in their sales and the number of employees
than firms located in other regions. Exploiting information on the exact geo-location of firms,
we show that these effects of favoritism are strongest in a close area of a 10 km radius around
a leader’s birthplace, and that the effects diminish by distance. In our baseline specification,
we find that favored firms located within about a 50 km radius of the leader’s birthplace have
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22% higher sales and 13% more employees compared to control firms. These effects translate
to an increase of $1.5 million in sales and 10 more workers employed in an average firm. Our
placebo analysis does not find evidence for pre-trends suggesting that the causality likely runs
from leader changes to firm outcomes.
We then exploit the richness of our enterprise survey data and study the mechanisms
that lead to such outcomes. We find that firms located in favored regions are not only larger
in size, but that they produce more output per labor, pay higher wages and have higher total
factor productivity compared to other firms. This evidence is consistent with the interpretation
that regional favoritism may be an efficient policy. However, several of our further pieces of
evidence speak against this hypothesis. First, our results indicate that the effects are driven
by the non-tradable sector. In the literature, episodes of rapid expansion of the non-tradable
sector, relative to the tradable, are associated with the inflows of funds. These may be driven
by, for example, natural resource booms, remittances or borrowing, all of which increase
the demand for non-tradable goods (see van der Ploeg 2011 for a comprehensive survey of
the literature). In contrast, overall productivity improvements should lead to more balanced
growth in the two sectors. Second, and relatedly, we do not find evidence that manufacturing
firms start to export more. Third, we find that the expansion of firms is partly fueled by direct
government transfers in the form of more public procurement contracts. Forth, we find that
the effects on firms are temporary such that they cease almost immediately after the leader
leaves office. Fifth, firms located in favored regions do not perceive any improvements in the
business environment, if anything denouncing the available infrastructure and the quality of
the labor force. Overall, these results are consistent with the interpretation that leaders divert
public resources towards their home regions generating higher demand for output produced
by firms operating in the non-tradable sector. This redistribution comes at the cost of other
regions and is indicative of a case of misallocation of resources.
As a third and final step, we setup a simple model of misallocation in the spirit of
Restuccia and Rogerson (2008). We use the model to quantify the aggregate implications
of regional favoritism. We consider an economy with two regions and two sectors, where
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firms face wedges driven by favoritism. We calibrate the model to match the moments that
we estimate empirically. Our counterfactual exercise shows that in an economy with spatial
wedges driven by favoritism, output is 0.5% lower compared to a distortion free economy. The
intuition behind this result is that the redistribution between regions increases incomes in the
home region and thus demand. The demand for non-tradable goods can be satisfied only by
local production, while the demand for tradable goods can also be met through imports from
the other region. Therefore, factors of production will reallocate towards the non-tradable
sector in the leaders’ home region and the tradable sector in the non-home region. Higher
concentration of labor in sectors decreases the marginal productivity of firms and results in
aggregate losses.
This paper is related to two strands of literature. First, we contribute to the evolving
literature on regional favoritism. i Miquel et al. (2007) is one of the first to lay down the
theoretical framework for favoritism, while Hodler and Raschky (2014) is one of the first to
document evidence for it. In particular, Hodler and Raschky (2014) uses satellite data from
across the globe and find higher intensity of nighttime lights in the birthplaces of the countries’
political leaders compared to other regions within countries. In a closely coupled strand of
literature, de Luca et al. (2018), Dickens (2018) observe higher night-light intensity in political
leaders’ ethnic homelands. Relatedly, Amodio et al. (2019), Asatryan et al. (2021), Franck
and Rainer (2012), Kramon and Posner (2016) find evidence for improved human capital
outcomes (such as in health, education and labor-markets) among individuals belonging to
either the same ethnicity or coming from the same region as those holding political power.
Several papers extend this work on ethno-regional favoritism to various sets of policies, such as
road-building in Kenyan districts (Burgess et al. 2015) and Sub-Saharan Africa more broadly
(Bandyopadhyay and Green 2019), infrastructure projects in Vietnam (Do et al. 2017),
school construction in Benin (André et al. 2018), enforcement of audits (Chu et al. 2021)
and taxes (Chen et al. 2019) in China, mining activities in Africa (Asatryan et al. 2021),
allocation of foreign aid in Africa (Anaxagorou et al. 2020, Dreher et al. 2019), among
others.
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Second, our paper relates to an important strand of literature on how the misallocation
of factors of production lead to substantial differences in aggregate total factor productivity.
This literature goes back to Hsieh and Klenow (2009, 2010), Restuccia and Rogerson (2008),
and is surveyed by Hopenhayn (2014), Restuccia and Rogerson (2017). In this context several
studies have used the enterprise survey data to estimate aggregate output losses caused by
various institutional frictions (Besley and Mueller 2018, Ranasinghe 2017). Our contribution
is to highlight a new source of misallocation that is driven by regional favoritism and which is
caused by endogenous concentration of production factors in opposite sectors in each region.
Several related papers study efficiency losses caused by policy distortions in spatial contexts.
Brandt et al. (2013) study China’s economy in a model with multiple provinces and two types of
firms (private and state-owned). Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2013) introduce labor wedges
into a model with cities to asses efficiency losses in the US and China. Fajgelbaum et al.
(2018) use an economic geography model to estimate welfare losses caused by heterogeneity
in tax systems across US states.
2 Empirical design
2.1 Data
Firms The source of our firm-level data are the World Bank Enterprise Surveys which have
been administered with a global methodology since 2006. The full sample of these surveys
spans over 140 countries, however only 98 countries were surveyed more than once. In these
countries survey waves were typically carried out with two to five years in between leading to
on average 2.5 survey waves per country. Surveys cover the non-agricultural formal private
sector, thus excluding firms which are fully government owned, are informal or are classified as
agricultural firms according to ISIC revision 3.1. Firms are drawn by stratified random sampling
where the stratification is done along firm size, geographic location within the country and
sector of activity. Furthermore, firms are required to have five or more employees. The number
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of firms sampled in a given country varies with the size of its economy. Large, medium and
small economies host, respectively, 1800-1200, 360 and 150 interviews.1
The enterprise surveys contain information on general firm characteristics such as age,
ownership structure, sector as well as indicators of their performance in terms of sales, em-
ployment and input factors. In addition firms are asked about their management practices,
relations to the government, crime and corruption and the business environment, an advantage
of this data that allows us to study favoritism effects and channels in greater detail.
For the main part of our empirical analysis we consider the sub-sample of surveys carried
out since 2009 as they provide us with geocoded data on the location of firms.2 In additional
specifications we use the general sample where we identify the location of firms according to
administrative regions. However, there are occasionally changes in the definition of regions
between survey waves. Therefore, we give priority to the smaller sub-sample of geocoded
data to achieve greater precision and to perform detailed spatial analysis, while we rely on the
larger sample to test the robustness of our baseline findings.
In total there are around 100 and 150 thousand enterprise surveys carried out in the
geocoded and regional samples, respectively. However, the key variables we use have missing
values of varying degree. Additionally, to alleviate bias in our estimates from outliers, we
exclude values that are outside three standard deviations of the calculated mean within an
industry and country income level. For our baseline analysis this leaves us with 80 to 58 thou-
sand firm-level observations depending on the outcome we study. In the regional specification
we have between 140 to 105 thousand observations. Figure 1 presents the geography of firm
locations, and Table A1 lists the countries and survey-waves in our sample.
Political leaders To identify political leaders in power we use the Archigos database of
political leaders version 4.1. It includes information on the start and end date of the primary
effective leader’s time in power. Archigos data is available until 2015 and we manually extend
1Size of the economy is determined by gross national income. Further information on the sampling and
stratification procedure can be found in the Enterprise Survey and Indicator Surveys sampling methodology
available at https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/en/methodology.
2For reasons of data protection the latitudes and longitudes are precise within 0.5 to 2 kilometers.
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Figure 1: Map of Leader’s Birthtowns and Firms in Our Sample
Notes : This map attempts to present the geography of our sample and of the identifying
variation. Red (and small) dots present firms. Black (and large) dots present circles of 100
km radius around national leader’s birthplace. Table A1 presents the list of countries and
survey-waves in our sample. 3
this data by including leaders from 2016 to 2020. We then utilize a plug-in that automatically
parses a leaders birth town to Google maps API and retrieves the latitude and longitude of
the town. We manually validate no matches or faulty matches which can arise due to towns
sharing same names, special characters in the town names or other reasons. We exclude any
leader with less than a year of tenure.
We merge this data on leaders to the enterprise data by country. In the geocoded sub-
sample we calculate the distance of every firm to each leader in the sample period. In the
total sample we generate a dummy indicating whether a firm is within a leaders region. In the
general sample we have a total of 396 leaders coming from 120 countries. The location of
leader regions are plotted in Figure 1. Since our empirical strategy builds on leader transitions,
3For our main sample there are around 25,000 African, 40,000 Asian, 20,000 European, 6,000 Middle
American and 10,500 South American firms available.
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our identifying variation comes from a much smaller sample than the 396 leaders. First, as
discussed above, the enterprise surveys are on average carried out only in 2.5 waves within
a country. Second, in many countries, especially in less democratic ones, we do not observe
leader transitions within our relatively short sample. Third, in cases when leaders were born in
foreign countries, we do not identify any favored region. Taking into account these restrictions,
our identifying variation comes from 15 countries in the baseline sample and from 33 countries
in the regional sample.
Country characteristics In order to allow for comparisons across countries and for the
interpretation of mean and aggregate values of monetary variables, we transform variables from
local currency units to 2009 USD. For this transformation, we use period average exchange
rates and GDP deflators from the World Banks World Development Indicators. To study
whether the effects of favoritism differ with respect to political and institutional features of
countries, we collect data on a democracy index from the Polity5 project, as well as data on
corruption perception indicators from Transparency International.
Tradable and non-tradable sector On a general level, the enterprise surveys identify
whether firms belong to the service or manufacturing sectors. At a more granular level, firms
report the ISIC revision 3.1 industry where their main product or service lies. We exploit this
information to construct a measure of tradability of products so as to categorize firms into
either the tradable or non-tradable sector. We rely on the micro-founded approach of Chen
and Novy (2011) that ranks the trade costs of 163 industries at the four-digit NACE level.4
We use this classification and categorize firms ranking 50 or higher as tradable. This exercise
leads to a total of around 26,500 tradable and 75,000 non-tradable firms in our geocoded
sample. We prefer this approach because, as noted by Holmes and Stevens (2014) many
product categories that are considered manufacturing tend to be sold only locally. For this
4We utilize conversion tables to translate our ISIC rev 3.1 classification to the 4-digit NACE rev.1 classi-
fication of industries.
8
reason we reclassify manufacturing sectors with very high trade costs, such as bricks, into the
non-tradable category.
Sample and summary statistics Table A1 of the appendix presents a detailed description
of our sample. The table lists countries, years, number of firms and leaders in our sample. We
also visualize this data on firms as well as the birth regions of leaders in the map of Figure 1.
Table A2 of the appendix shows the summary statistics of the variables that we use in this
paper.
2.2 Identification
Empirical strategy Our empirical strategy exploits leader transitions and the location of
firms for identification. We compare firms located in “favored” areas in the sense of the
current national leader being born in that region, to firms in the same area but in a time
period when the area was not being represented by the current leader. Firms located in other
non-favored areas but having similar observable characteristics, such as being in the same
industry, serve as our control group.
As discussed in Section 2.1, our data measures the location of firms either by the exact
geocoordinates of the firm or by the administrative region of its location as reported in the
enterprise surveys. The geocoded specification is preferred over the regions specification as
the former is more precise and allows to study spatial effects around the birth town of the
leader, however this comes at the cost of losing identifying variation from the longer sample
period. We start by studying firms with information on exact geo-locations where we can
identify the effects on granular distances. As complementary evidence, we then replicate this
exercise on the larger sample.
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Geocoded data We estimate a difference-in-differences model of the following form:
log(Outcomef,i,r,c,t) =α + β
km · LeaderAreakml,c × Termc,t+ (1)
γ · Controlsf,t + τi + µkmf + λr + ηc,t + εf,i,r,c,t
where Outcomef,i,r,c,t is the logarithm of either of the following five main outcome variables:
total sales, number of permanent employees, output per worker, wage per worker, and total
factor productivity (TFP). We estimate TFP by regressing output in terms of sales on costs
of input factors and the net book value of land, buildings and machinery.5 We then study the
residual from this regression as an outcome in equation (1). Our unit of observation is the
firm f belonging to industry i located in region r of country c in year t.
The βkm is our main coefficient of interest. It is identified by the set of dummy variables
LeaderAreakml,c , which set firms to be treated if they are located within a km kilometer radius
to the birth town of leader l in country c. The superscript km ranges from 10 to 100 km
around the leader’s birthplace in 5 km intervals. Firms located in country c but outside a
150 km radius of the leader l’s birthplace serve as our control group. To get at the average
treatment effect, we interact LeaderAreakml,c with Terml,c,t which is a dummy indicating
whether leader l is currently in office.
Controlsf is a vector of firm specific control variables including the age of the firm,
its ownership shares belonging to foreigners or to the public sector. τi, µ
km
f , λr and ηc,t are
industry, leader area, region and country-by-time fixed effects, respectively. The error term is
captured by εf,i,r,c,t which we two-way cluster at the level of country-sector-year and leader
area following the design of De Haas and Poelhekke (2019).
5We sum up the costs for various input factors such as labor, raw materials and intermediate goods or
electricity. As we use total sales as output in this regression, it constitutes as a revenue based TFP measure.
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Regional data As discussed above, we also estimate a version of equation (1) where treat-
ment is defined based on the birth region of the leader. The equation is as follow:
log(Outcomef,i,r,c,t) =α + β · LeaderRegionr,c × Termc,t+ (2)
γ · Controlsf,t + τi + λr + ηc,t + εf,i,r,c,t
where the treatment status of a firm is defined by LeaderRegionr,c which is a dummy variable
indicating whether any national leader was born in region r or not.
Identifying assumptions Our difference-in-differences model compares firms located within
areas or regions around the leader’s birthplace before and after the leader comes to power
controlling for firms belonging to same industries but located further away from leader’s birth-
place. The main identifying assumption in difference-in-differences setting is that treatment
and control groups follow parallel trends prior to the treatment. In our case this will be vio-
lated if, for example, faster developing regions are more likely to nominate a national leader.
We validate this assumption, in Section 3.4 by conducting an analysis that tests for effects
in leads and lags of the treatment variable. We do not find evidence that any of the sev-
eral outcome variables between treated and control firms are different from zero in the years
leading to the nomination of the leader. This absence of pre-trends suggests no systematic
bias coming from selection as long as the selection effect is captured by the observables, and
assuming that the selection effect is homogenous across regions so that the average effect on
the pre-trends does not mask potentially offsetting trends. This evidence is consistent with
previous work that has used regional level data to study the patterns of regional favoritism
and, similar to our test, providing evidence against the existence of pre-trends.
3 Micro evidence
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Figure 2: Treatment Effects by Distance to Leader’s Birthtown
Logarithm total sales
Notes : Regression is estimated using equation 1. Red line plots the coefficient βkm
estimated for each radius separately. Shaded area represent 95% confidence intervals. The
dependent variable is total sales and is specified in logarithm. All regressions include fixed
effects for leader circles, regions, industries, and country-by-years. Standard errors are
two-way clustered at the level of country-sector-year and leader area.
3.1 Results by distance
We start by studying the treatment effects of favoritism using the detailed geolocation of
firms. We are agnostic about the area around the birthplace which is potentially affected by
favoritism. Therefore, we exploit information on the exact location of firms and, as specified
in equation 1, estimate the treatment effects of favoritism on firm outcomes in a radius going
from 10 km to 100 km around the leader’s birthplace with 5 km intervals. In this preliminary
exercise which aims to understand the spatial dimension of our potential treatment effect, we
use the logarithm of total sales as the main firm level outcome.
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Figure 2 plots the treatment effects of favoritism by distance to the leader’s birthplace.
The effects are strongest in areas very close, with firms located in a circle of 10 km around
the leader’s birthplace having on average nearly 30% higher sales than similar firms located
further away. These effects decrease by distance and become indistinguishable from zero after
around 70 km away from the leader’s birthplace.
The magnitudes of these effects are substantial. Taking into account the number of firms
operating in these areas and the sum of their sales we can calculate the aggregate effects of
favoritism. This effect amounts to about a $25 billion increase in total sales due to favoritism
as measured in 2009 nominal USD. Hodler and Raschky (2014) calculates that leader’s regions
on average have 1% higher GDP in the worldwide sample, but the effects can reach up to
9% in certain subsamples. We take their approach of mapping the effects on nightlight to
GDP growth using the correlation coefficient of 0.8 between firm revenues and GDP growth
as estimated by Cravino and Levchenko (2017). In our case, the corresponding effect on the
favored regions6 is 11% when transformed into GDP growth values.7
3.2 Baseline results
For the ease of presentation, we define a baseline area of treatment around the leader’s
birthplace and in the rest of the paper present our estimates based on this area, rather than
having to estimate dozens of point effects over distance for each outcome variable. We choose
the baseline treatment area to include firms located within a 50 km radius around the leader’s
birthplace. We do not take smaller circles in the baseline given the trade-off that we would lose
firm observations and therefore statistical power. Also, focusing on a small circle may allow
us to obtain large estimates but its aggregate implications on the economy will be relatively
6To be more comparable with Hodler and Raschky (2014), in this back of the envelope calculation we
take the coefficient estimated for regions from Table 2 rather than the coefficient estimated for certain radii
around leader’s birthtowns as in Figure 2.
7Following Hodler and Raschky (2014) and other papers in this literature, we study whether the effects
of favoritism are different across countries with different political institutions. In particular, in Table A4 we
interact our treatment effect with the polity score of democracy and a measure of corruption perceptions. To
study potential non-linear effects we also interact with the squared values of these indices. Overall, we do not
find evidence that in our sample democracy or corruption either constrain or exacerbate the effects of regional
favoritism.
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Table 1: Treatment Effects around Leader’s Birthtown
VARIABLES Log Log Log Log Log Output TFP
Sales Sales Employees Wage per Worker Residual
Treated area 0.2828*** 0.2139*** 0.1404** 0.0927** 0.0954*** 0.0479***
(0.0892) (0.0749) (0.0588) (0.0436) (0.0173) (0.0080)
Firm age 0.0251*** 0.0192*** 0.0030*** 0.0049*** 0.0067***
(0.0021) (0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0007)
% owned foreign 0.0171*** 0.0102*** 0.0038*** 0.0065*** 0.0050***
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004)
% owned public 0.0174*** 0.0153*** -0.0001 0.0016 0.0048***
(0.0042) (0.0029) (0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0015)
Constant 16.9923*** 16.4067*** 2.8020*** 11.6463*** 13.5864*** -0.1344***
(0.0217) (0.0433) (0.0273) (0.0167) (0.0189) (0.0130)
Observations 70,177 70,177 79,718 66,262 69,524 57,840
R-squared 0.6369 0.6660 0.2582 0.8286 0.7796 0.2995
F 10.06 129.0 148.4 33.30 45.85 785.0
Notes : Regressions are estimated using equation 1. Treatment is set equal to 50km radius
around leader’s birthtown. Dependent variables are specified in logarithms. Mean values of
dependent variables in levels are 6.8 million USD in columns 1-2, 78 employees in column 3,
104 thousand USD in column 4, and 7423 USD in columns 5. USD is measured in 2009
nominal values. All regressions include fixed effects for leader circles, regions, industries, and
country-by-years. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the level of country-sector-year
and leader area.
inconsequential. On the other hand, we do not take larger circles as, according to Figure 2,
the treatment effect would start to decline. This choice of fixing the baseline treated area to
a 50 km radius is necessarily a selective one. This choice in general will not matter for the
direction of the effects that we identify. However, it may somewhat effect the magnitudes that
we identify, and therefore, when appropriate, we can provide robustness tests of our results
for other distances.
We present our baseline results in Table 1. The first column regresses log sales on the
treatment variable and fixed effects. In the second column we include key firm characteristics
as control variables. The estimated coefficient is highly significant and implies that firms
located close to the leader’s hometown experience a 21% increase in sales relative to firms
in the other parts of the country. In the third column our dependent variable is the log total
number of employees. Again we observe highly significant positive effects of 14% on average.
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These effects represent an increase in sales of $1.5 million and in employment of nearly 10
workers for an average firm.
The size of the estimated coefficient on employment is smaller than the one on sales.
Consistent with this, in columns 4 and 5 we find that treated firms pay higher wages and
produce more output per capita. Finally, column 6 of Table 1 shows that treated firms not
only grow in size but that they also become more productive in the sense of estimated total
factor productivity.
3.3 Region level results
As discussed in section 2.2, we prefer to work with the data where information on the geolo-
cation of firms is available. However for a quite larger sample of firms we have data on the
region of location of the firm. This larger sample also uses twice as many leader transitions
for identification than the geolocated sample. Therefore as a complementary exercise to our
baseline results, we run regressions where the treatment is defined according to the region of
birth of the leader as opposed to the exact radius around leader’s birthplace. Table 2 shows
these estimates, as before using the five main outcome variables of interest. As expected,
the treatment effects become somewhat smaller and less precise. However, in all cases the
evidence for positive and statistically significant effects can be replicated.8
3.4 Effects before and after leader transitions
We conduct placebo estimations to ensure that our results are driven by leader transitions
rather than existing trends in their regions. Since we are using a difference-in-differences
specification, we want to make sure that there are no pre-trends that potentially drive our
results. For this reason we construct a placebo treatment variable by assuming that the
leadership transition took place up to two years earlier than it actually happened. In a similar
spirit we also create a treatment variable that takes a value of of one for the period covering
8In an additional specification we interact the region treatment with the 50 km area treatment. Table A3
of the appendix shows the results. Not surprisingly we find strongest effects on firms which are located within
a 50 km radius from leader’s birthplace and at the same time belong to the leader’s birth regions.
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Table 2: Treatment Effects in Leader’s Birthregion
VARIABLES Log Log Log Log Log Output TFP
Sales Sales Employees Wage per Worker Residual
Treated region 0.1543*** 0.1308** 0.0609** 0.1013*** 0.0662** 0.0190*
(0.0581) (0.0512) (0.0290) (0.0343) (0.0280) (0.0111)
Firm age 0.0257*** 0.0195*** 0.0032*** 0.0051*** 0.0060***
(0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004)
% owned foreign 0.0173*** 0.0103*** 0.0041*** 0.0067*** 0.0045***
(0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0002)
% owned public 0.0176*** 0.0157*** 0.0011 0.0011 0.0034***
(0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008)
Constant 16.8800*** 16.2709*** 2.7792*** 11.5343*** 13.4884*** -0.1447***
(0.0129) (0.0238) (0.0135) (0.0103) (0.0139) (0.0097)
Observations 126,359 126,359 142,710 121,357 125,191 107,439
R-squared 0.6319 0.6643 0.2626 0.8382 0.7800 0.2741
F 7.048 388.6 499.3 62.28 90.31 149.6
Notes : Regressions are estimated using equation 2. Treatment is set equal to the
administrative region where the leader was born. Dependent variables are specified in
logarithms. All regressions include fixed effects for regions, industries and country-by-years.
Standard errors are two-way clustered at the level of country-sector-year and leader region.
up to two years after the leadership transition. We then re-estimate equation (1) including
these leads and lags. The results are presented in Table 3. As can be seen, neither leads nor
lags have significant effects on sales or employment.
Additionally, the fact that the firm growth effect dies after the leader leaves implies that
we do not find support for the big push hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, large positive
shocks and investments can help firms change their permanent growth trajectories (Murphy
et al. 1989). This is in contrast to few recent papers. For example, Kline and Moretti (2013)
provide evidence that a place-based policy in the US had long term effects, while Lu et al.
(2019) study China’s successful implementation of Special Economic Zones.
4 Mechanisms
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Table 3: Treatment Effects before and After Leader Transitions
VARIABLES Log Log Log Log
Sales Sales Employees Employees
0-2 years before treatment -0.0697 0.0208
(0.2597) (0.2275)
0-2 year after treatment 0.0248 0.0152
(0.1190) (0.0814)
Treated area 0.1953* 0.2156*** 0.1456** 0.1413**
(0.0992) (0.0766) (0.0721) (0.0609)
Firm age 0.0251*** 0.0251*** 0.0192*** 0.0192***
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0013) (0.0013)
% owned foreign 0.0171*** 0.0171*** 0.0102*** 0.0102***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0005)
% owned public 0.0174*** 0.0174*** 0.0153*** 0.0153***
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0029) (0.0029)
Constant 16.4122*** 16.4060*** 2.8004*** 2.8015***
(0.0493) (0.0436) (0.0322) (0.0277)
Observations 70,177 70,177 79,718 79,718
R-squared 0.6660 0.6660 0.2582 0.2582
F 105.8 103.4 118.6 120.8
Notes : Regressions are estimated based on equation 1 but adding the leads and lags of the
treatment variable. Treatment is set equal to 50km radius around leader’s birthtown.
Dependent variables are specified in logarithms. All regressions include fixed effects for
leader circles, regions, industries, and country-by-years. Standard errors are two-way
clustered at the level of country-sector-year and leader region.
4.1 Sectoral results
As a central mechanism behind our baseline result, we investigate how regional favoritism
affects the sectors of the economy. To this end we split firms into the tradable and non-
tradable sector. As we discuss in Section 5, we expect sectors to be affected differentially from
redistributive policies implemented by the government. In particular, our model predicts that
the non-tradable sector is likely to benefit more from redistributive policies. This prediction
is similar and in line with the literature studying inflows of funds into developing countries
from commodity booms, remittances, international aid or borrowing. Such inflows increase
incomes of households and thus consumption. The increased demand for tradable goods
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Table 4: Treatment Effects by Sector
VARIABLES Log Log Output TFP Log Log
Sales per Worker Residual Employees Wage
Treated area 0.2554*** 0.1455*** 0.1018*** 0.1239** 0.1010***
(0.0692) (0.0201) (0.0145) (0.0487) (0.0387)
Tradable 0.1194** -0.1777*** -0.0805* 0.2976*** -0.0942***
(0.0473) (0.0614) (0.0451) (0.0371) (0.0167)
Treated#Tradable -0.1386** -0.1504** -0.1281** 0.0335 -0.0160
(0.0670) (0.0731) (0.0522) (0.0583) (0.0291)
Firm age 0.0257*** 0.0048*** 0.0062*** 0.0199*** 0.0030***
(0.0021) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0007)
% owned foreign 0.0174*** 0.0065*** 0.0051*** 0.0104*** 0.0039***
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004)
% owned public 0.0177*** 0.0020 0.0050*** 0.0153*** -0.0000
(0.0042) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0028) (0.0020)
Constant 16.3595*** 13.6339*** -0.1127*** 2.7106*** 11.6720***
(0.0395) (0.0212) (0.0126) (0.0328) (0.0162)
Observations 70,177 69,524 57,840 79,718 66,262
R-squared 0.6585 0.7731 0.2615 0.2374 0.8269
F 100.00 470.8 265.6 112.3 31.65
Notes : Regressions are estimated based on equation 1 but adding an interaction term
between treatment and sectors. Treatment is set equal to 50km radius around leader’s
birthtown. Dependent variables are specified in logarithms. All regressions include fixed
effects for leader circles, regions, and country-by-years. Standard errors are two-way
clustered at the level of country-sector-year and leader region.
can be met by imports, while the demand for the non-tradables can be satisfied only by
domestic production. Such episodes lead to relative increases in the prices of non-tradable
goods (exchange rate appreciation), reallocation of factors of production towards the non-
tradable sector and deindustrialization. van der Ploeg (2011) provides a review of the resource
curse literature and its implications. In a more recent study, De Haas and Poelhekke (2019)
investigate the implications of natural resource booms and sectoral reallocation patterns using
the firm data from the Enterprise Surveys as well.
In Table 4 we include an additional interaction term between the treatment variable and
a dummy variable for firms in the tradable sector. Section 2.1 describes how we construct this
dummy variable. The results in column one show that tradable sector firms located around
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the leader’s hometown benefit less from favoritism. Further, the results in column 2 imply
that they do not experience any growth in output per worker. Column 3 yields similar results
for TFP. Growth in output per worker and in productivity in the favored areas are completely
driven by the non-tradable sector firms. In column 4 we observe that wage growth is similar
in both sectors. This is consistent with the idea that there is high level of mobility between
sectors. And despite the fact that non-tradable firms experience more growth, wages faced by
firms in both sectors are similar because both sectors compete for similar workers. In column
5 we document that there are no sectoral differences in employment growth.
4.2 Business environment
Next we try to understand what kind of policies and tools leaders use to contribute to firm
expansion in their region. The enterprise surveys ask questions regarding the constraints
that firms face while doing business. Firms are asked to evaluate certain obstacles to their
business on a five point Likert-type scale. We center and normalize these variables to report
the results in terms of standard deviations in Table 5. In the first column the dependent
variable is the average of all business constraints. The estimated coefficient is positive and
significant indicating a worsening of the business environment. However, this measure is
not informative on the specific source of the constraint, therefore in the following three
columns we study its individual components. The results show that there is no change in
the institutional environment around the leader’s home town. Meanwhile, the estimated
coefficients on infrastructure constraints and input constraints are positive and significant.
This implies that firms operating in the areas around the leaders hometown see the lack of
infrastructure as well as inputs to a lesser extent as significant constraints to their businesses.
The input constraint concept itself combines three components, the results for which are
displayed in the last three columns of Table 5. From these regressions we observe that firms
around the leader’s hometown complain about the lack of land and educated workforce while
the coefficient on access to finance measure is not significantly different from zero. In terms of
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Table 5: Effects on the Business Environment around Leader’s Birthtown
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES Avgerage Infrastructure Institutions Input Land Finance Workforce
Treated area 0.1133* 0.1558*** 0.0316 0.0979** 0.0879*** -0.0493 0.1919***
(0.0615) (0.0575) (0.0787) (0.0384) (0.0264) (0.0336) (0.0483)
Firm age -0.0011*** -0.0008*** 0.0003 -0.0018*** -0.0025*** -0.0022*** 0.0008***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003)
% owned foreign -0.0006*** 0.0007*** -0.0009*** -0.0013*** -0.0008*** -0.0024*** 0.0005***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
% owned public -0.0017** -0.0014** -0.0021*** -0.0012** -0.0026*** -0.0005 0.0007
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Constant -0.0004 -0.0276** -0.0080 0.0210* 0.0312*** 0.0663*** -0.0590***
(0.0154) (0.0138) (0.0191) (0.0119) (0.0102) (0.0118) (0.0140)
Observations 65,598 78,826 68,654 76,060 77,954 79,469 79,861
R-squared 0.3969 0.2924 0.3902 0.2806 0.2236 0.1947 0.2354
F 8.105 7.314 9.702 18.79 22.15 34.17 6.004
Notes : Regressions are estimated using equation 1. Treatment is set equal to 50km radius
around leader’s birthtown. Dependent variables are indices that have been centered at zero
and normalized with variance of one. All regressions include fixed effects for leader circles,
regions, industries, and country-by-years. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the level
of country-sector-year and leader region.
relative magnitudes, among the several types of business constraints, firms are most concerned
about the quality of the workforce.
Taken together these results imply that leaders divert resources into their home region and
generate higher demand for output produced by firms in the hometown area. However, they
do not make sufficient infrastructure improvements to keep up with the increasing needs of the
firms. This result is intuitive because infrastructure investments require planing and proper
project implementation. Such actions require longer time horizons and more effort than, for
example, awarding contracts to favored firms. So our results indicate that the leaders are
more likely to choose the latter option and other similar mechanisms to promote development
in the home region. It is also possible that leaders make infrastructure investments but
because of improper implementation they do not sufficiently contribute to the actual stock of
infrastructure.
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Regarding the input constraints the regressions indicate that leaders do not directly affect
the capital market. The increasing complaints about land is rather intuitive because this factor
is in fixed supply and it does not increase proportionately with output. Finally, the result in
the last column indicates that educated labor force also does not increase sufficiently to meet
the demand for labor. This is also consistent with the increasing wages around the leader’s
hometown as presented, for example, in Table 1. It is also worthwhile to note that, in the
context of ethnic favoritism, Dickens (2018) shows that there is no increase in migration into
the leader’s ethnic region. So, it seems there are some frictions on labor mobility that prevent
adjustment to take place. Ethnic tensions among various groups can be one factor hindering
labor mobility within countries.
4.3 Further mechanisms
In Table 6 we explore further channels that can help us better understand how regional
favoritism works. First we consider whether firms located in proximity to the leader’s birth
place are more likely to secure government contracts. Governments can affect the allocation
decision of such contracts and provide them to favored firms. Our estimations confirm this
hypothesis, we observe that firms in the treated area are 2.4% more likely to secure government
contracts. In the second column of Table 6 we restrict our sample to the tradable sector firms
only and study whether there is an increase in the likelihood of firms to report to be exporters.
The results show that there is no such evidence. A positive and significant coefficient would
indicate an improvement in the competitiveness among firms located around the leader’s home
town because of better infrastructure and public goods provision. However, since we did not
observe such improvements in Table 5, it is rather intuitive that the exporting prospects of
firms in the leader’s region do not improve. In the following two columns we study whether
firms have introduced new products or processes. For new products we observe a positive and
significant coefficient, while for new processes a negative one. Our interpretation is that higher
incomes of consumers can generate more demand and increase firms’ incentives to introduce
new products. However, this horizontal expansion does not necessarily imply improvements
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Table 6: Evidence on Further Mechanisms
VARIABLES Government Firm has New product/service New process Any informal
contract secured? any exports? last 3 years? last 3 years payments?
Treated area 0.0240*** 0.0099 0.0244** -0.0750*** -0.0504
(0.0041) (0.0092) (0.0118) (0.0031) (0.0329)
Firm age 0.0016*** 0.0028*** 0.0010*** 0.0008*** 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
% owned foreign -0.0001 0.0040*** 0.0009*** 0.0006*** -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
% owned public 0.0020*** 0.0010 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0003)
Constant 0.1470*** 0.2741*** 0.3527*** 0.3908*** 0.3004***
(0.0033) (0.0090) (0.0047) (0.0028) (0.0085)
Observations 78,635 23,436 57,205 55,932 80,810
R-squared 0.1013 0.2441 0.2113 0.2944 0.2736
F 37.07 113.5 37.49 3818 0.707
Notes : Regressions are estimated using equation 1. Treatment is set equal to 50km radius
around leader’s birth town. Mean values of dependent variables from left to right are 17.8%,
37%, 38%. 39.4 % and 28.9 %. All regressions include fixed effects for leader circles,
regions, industries, and country-by-years. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the level
of country-sector-year and leader region.
in efficiency.9 At the same time process innovations are more likely to be associated with
improved efficiency.
In the last column the dependent variable is an indicator for firms reporting whether they
have made informal payments. The estimated coefficient is negative but it is not significant. A
negative coefficient would imply that leaders reduce informal tax collection and provide better
treatment to firms located in the areas around their birthplaces. These informal payments are
one manifestation of policy distortions that have been discussed in the misallocation literature
(Hsieh and Klenow 2009, Restuccia and Rogerson 2008).
4.4 Size and productivity distribution of firms
On top of the average effects of favoritism we have identified so far, we are also interested
in the question of whether favoritism differently affects the distribution of firms. Following
9For example, in the multi-product firm framework of Mayer et al. (2014) an exogenous increase in demand
can lead the firm to expand its product scope without any improvement in productivity.
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Figure 3: Size Distribution of Firms in Treated and Control Areas
(a) Sales (b) Output per Employee
Notes : Histograms plot the distribution of firms with respect to log sales and log output
per worker in treated area during and outside the leaders time in office.
Hsieh and Klenow (2009), in Figure 3 we present histograms on the distribution of firms in
terms of the total sales and output per employee by plotting the distribution of residuals using
equation (1). We compare firms in the leader areas, where the green bars represent the firms
during the leaders time in office, while the bins showing firms outside the time in office are left
transparent for ease of comparison. If the favoritism effects were to change the distribution of
firms, we would expect to observe substantial mismatches in the distribution mass of the two
groups. Thus, this descriptive evidence does not imply that favoritism had differential effects
across the firm distribution. This results supports our assumption of modeling homogeneous
firms.
5 Aggregate implications
In this section we introduce a simple theoretical framework that will facilitate to the inter-
pretation of the empirical findings. We will also use this framework to estimate the size of
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distortions created by regional favoritism and quantify aggregate losses generated by such
policies.
5.1 Framework
We consider a two regions and two sectors economy with perfectly competitive firms. Regions
denoted i ∈ {h, a} are the home region which receives subsidies τh and and the rest of the
country a which will pay taxes τa to finance these subsidies. Positive values of τi will denote
taxes and negative values subsidies. We will use the term taxes to refer to τi but this should
not be taken literally because these taxes capture various wedges discussed by Restuccia and
Rogerson (2008). These may include informal payments for which we saw some tentative
evidence in Table 6. Firms in both regions produce manufacturing goods (m) and services
(s) j ∈ {m, s}. Manufacturing goods are traded across regions and internationally, they
correspond to the tradable sector in our empirical analysis. On the other hand services are
produced and consumed locally only, and thus match the definition of the non-tradable sector
above. We will assume that both regions are symmetric. Our data provides evidence in
support of this assumption. We run regressions on outcomes that can proxy the average level
of development (output per worker and wage) and include an indicator variable for circles that
had leaders. The estimated coefficient on this indicator variable turns out to be very close
to 0 and statistically insignificant, which implies that the leader circles are not systematically
wealthier or poorer compared to other places.10
5.1.1 Production




10Our estimations include country-year fixed effects and exclude observations for circle-years during which
the leader was in office from that circle.
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Output Yij is produced by using labor Lij. Both regions are endowed with a fixed amount
of homogenous labor Li which is allocated across sectors competitively. Labor is perfectly
mobile across sectors but immobile across regions. We do not introduce capital into the
production function because our empirical results do not show any differential frictions in the
capital market due to regional favoritism. Our empirical results were consistent with high level
of labor mobility between sectors (Table 4), and low mobility between regions (Table 1). Also
in Table 5 we observed that firms do not face any differential constraints for having access to
finance. Thus, we do not add capital to keep the model more tractable.
Using this notation, firm’s optimization problem can be written as
(1− τi)pijYij − wiLij, (4)
where pij is the price in region i and sector j and wi the wage in region i. Perfect mobility
between sectors implies that firms in both sectors face the same wage. We will set the price
of the manufacturing good to unity (phm = pam = 1).
5.1.2 Consumption
Both regions are populated by representative agents who derive utility by combining services




is . Agents maximize their utility
subject to the budget constraint
pisCis + Cim ≤ wiLi (5)
5.1.3 Market clearing
The equilibrium requires clearing in labor and goods markets
Lhs + Lhm = Lh, Las + Lam = La (6)
Chs = Yhs, Ccs = Ycs (7)
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Chm + Cam = Yhm + Yam (8)
Finally, the government balances its books, which requires that the amount of tax col-
lected in the non-home regions should equal to the subsidies provided in the home region
τh(phsYhs + Yhm) + τa(pasYas + Yam) = 0. (9)
5.2 Model discussion
The model yields several predictions which help us to understand the empirical results observed
in Section 3. The key outcome of the model concerns the relationship between the tax rate
and the relative allocation of labor between sectors. The model implies that the share of labor




Given that the home region receives a subsidy and the non-home region pays taxes, this
implies that a relatively larger share of labor in the home region will be allocated to the
services sector. The intuition behind this result is rather simple. Since only the tradable
good can be transferred across regions, the wedges introduced by the government require
transfers from the non-home region. The relative supply of the tradable good in the home
region increases because it receives transfers. As a result, it becomes optimal for firms in
the home region to allocate relatively more resources to the production in the services sector
to meet consumer demand. Consequently, both regions will have relatively more resources
allocated to one of the sectors compared to the economy without wedges. The concentration
of the resources in any of the sectors implies lower level of marginal physical output in the
presence of decreasing returns to scale technology. As a result the implementation of taxes
will generate aggregate losses in the economy.
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Another prediction of the model concerns the effect of taxes on wages. Consistent with
the empirical results documented in Table 1, wages decrease with taxes.
∂wi
∂τi
< 0 =⇒ wh > wf. (11)
5.3 Calibration
The qualitative discussion of the model’s predictions implied that taxes generate net losses.
In this section we use standard parameter values from the literature and target some key
moments from the empirical section to quantitatively asses the size of taxes required to
generate observed output differences and quantify the losses generated by them. We will
follow the macroeconomic literature and set the share of labor α = 2/3, and the parameter
governing the share of manufacturing goods consumption in developing economies γ = 0.31.
We will assume that each region is endowed with one unit of labor. Our key objective is
to choose parameters τh and τa such that we can match the 22 % total output differences
between regions and make sure that the government’s budget constraint (9) is satisfied. This
value is taken from column 2 of Table 1. Notice that the 22 % target is not relative to
the distortion free economy but relative to the other region because our empirical estimates
capture this effect.
Since both regions are symmetric, in the absence of wedges both regions produce and
consume exactly the same quantities. In the first row of Table 7 we present the relative changes
in some key estimates relative to the tax free economy quantities. As already discussed the
relative share of labor allocated to the services production in the home region increases.
Quantitatively this change is about 12 %, while in the non-home region the corresponding
figure goes down by 10%. The following column displays the relative change in prices of non-
tradable goods. There is a 15% increase in prices in the home region. In the data we do not
observe these quantities and cannot compare them but there was strong suggestive evidence
that prices of non-tradable goods increase in treated circles. For example, in Table 4, we
observed an increase in Y/L ratio only in services sector. In our data output is measured as
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Table 7: The Effect of Distortions on Factors and Output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Lhs Las phs Lh Y W
Immobile labor % 12.00 -11 16 0 -0.5 -0.7
Mobile labor % 16.00 -14 2 13 -0.25 -0.3
Notes : The table displays the changes in percentages relative to the distortion-
free economy. In column 6 Y refers to total output in the economy and in
column 7 W refers to aggregate welfare in terms of consumption equivalents.
In the first row labor is immobile across regions. In the second row labor is
perfectly mobile.
price times quantity and we do not have information on physical output. However, in Table 5
and 6 we do not find any supporting evidence for improvements in efficiency, so it is very likely
that the Y/L ratio is driven by increasing prices of non-tradable goods. Column four displays
the change in aggregate labor. By assumption this measure does not change because labor
is assumed to be immobile across regions. The fifth column displays the net loss in total real
output, which amounts to 0.5%. In the last column we also report aggregate welfare changes
measured in consumption equivalents. The decline in welfare is larger than in output because
of the concavity of the utility function for individual goods.
In the second row of Table 7 we consider a specification with perfect labor mobility. In
this environment workers will flow to the home region until wages are equalized across both
locations. Thus, in column 4 we observe that total labor in the home region increases by
14%. The flow of workers between regions is also reflected in a larger increase (decline) in
employment in the services sector in the home (non-home) region. This mitigates the effect
on prices, such that we observe only a small increase in prices. Perfect mobility of labor
also mitigates aggregate losses. In terms of output these losses are halved compared to the
specification with no labor mobility between regions.
The real situation lies between these two extreme cases. The specification with immobile
labor between regions is inconsistent with the data because it cannot generate an increase in
total employment in the leader’s region, while the specification with mobile labor is inconsis-
tent with the data because it generates very small price changes and equalization of wages.
Probably, the proper specification involves some frictions on labor mobility that lead to only
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partial wage equalization. These frictions may involve direct utility costs or time/efficiency
losses for migrant workers. We do not take a stand on the specific formulation of these losses
and their parametrization. But as the specification with perfectly mobile labor demonstrates,
even under very loose assumptions regional favoritism generates aggregate output and welfare
losses.
6 Conclusions
Regional favoritism, the spatial redistribution of wealth within countries in favor of political
leader’s home regions, is a widespread phenomenon especially prevalent in low and middle
income countries. While evidence behind this phenomenon has been extensively documented
on various levels, the implications of regional favoritism are not very clearly understood. A
commonly held normative view is that favoritism is necessarily a negative phenomenon arguably
being fueled by corruption and other forms of rent seeking. However, discrimination can also
lead to higher welfare if, for example, leaders are better informed and are able to subsidize
productive activities in the economy at the expense of more wasteful ones.
In this paper we try to solve this normative tradeoff by first identifying the micro effects
of favoritism on a global sample of firms, and then quantifying the macro effects of favoritism
by feeding the estimated empirical parameters into a revised model of resource misallocation.
Our empirical results suggest that firms located close to leaders’ bithplaces not only grow in
size but also become more productive. While such productivity improvements could potentially
lead to more growth for the whole country, our further analysis does not support that outlook.
In particular, our evidence shows that this evolution of firms in favored regions is driven by a
rapid expansion of the non-tradable sectors, rather than substantial gain among manufacturing
firms. One channel behind this effect are direct transfers to firms through public procurement
contracts. Importantly, these positive and economically substantial effects on firms are not
sustainable and vanish after leaders leave office.
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We quantify that the net aggregate effects of these re-allocations of resources across
regions and sectors cost countries on average 0.5% of their output every year. One policy
implication is that countries can become substantially better off if they manage to constrain
the regional redistributive policies of their leaders. Our paper is less clear on how this could
be achieved, since our evidence on the role of democratic institutions as constraining factor
is rather weak. Another lesson from our finding is that while the re-allocation of resources
towards certain firms can improve their outcomes substantially, such policies are in general
hurtful for the country as a whole and should be considered carefully.
Our results require several caveats. First, we study regional favoritism which may be
a combination of various intentional and unintentional policies. It may also partly include
policies working on other forms of societal divides such as through ethnic, religious and cultural
lines. Future and more careful studies could try to disentangle the effects of these various
policies. Second, we focus on leaders and ignore other systematically important politicians.
This focus is purely due to data constraints. It would be potentially interesting to study
the home regions of important members of the executive, legislative and judicial branches
of the government. Third, future research can more seriously consider the endogeneity of
regions. Political leaders gain power often as a result of battles between complicated power
structures, which may or may not reflect the underlying economic trends happening in the
regions. Although we provided reassuring evidence on these concerns using our difference-
in-difference framework, our study very much remains a first pass. Fourth, we neglect the
potential impact of favoritism on the entry, exit and migration of firms. Our survey data is
not well equipped to explore this question, but it may remain an interesting topic for future
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Table A1: Sample description
Country Year # firms # leaders
Afghanistan 2008 535 2
2013 410




Angola 2005 425 1
2009 360




Armenia 2007 374 2
2011 360
Azerbaijan 2007 380 2
2011 390
Bahamas 2009 150 5
Bangladesh 2012 1442 3
Barbados 2009 150 3




Belize 2009 150 2
Benin 2015 150 3
Bhutan 2014 253 6





Botswana 2005 342 2
2009 268
Brazil 2007 1802 3






BurkinaFaso 2008 394 2
Burundi 2005 270 3
2013 157
Cambodia 2015 373 1
Cameroon 2008 363 1
2015 361
Continued on next page
Table A1 –continued from previous page
Country Year # firms # leaders
Chad 2017 153 1
Chile 2005 1017 4
2009 1033
China 2011 2700 3




Costarica 2009 538 5










CÃ´te d’Ivoire 2007 526 2
2015 361
DRC 2005 340 1
2009 359
2012 529
Djibouti 2012 266 1
DominicanRepublic 2009 360 3
2015 359
Ecuador 2005 658 5
2009 366
2016 361
Egypt 2012 2897 4
2015 1483
2016 331
ElSalvador 2005 693 4
2009 360
2015 719





Eswatini 2005 307 2
2015 150
Ethiopia 2011 644 2
2014 848
Gambia 2005 174 2
2017 150
2018 1
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Table A1 –continued from previous page
Country Year # firms # leaders
Ghana 2006 494 3
2012 720
Guatemala 2005 522 5
2009 590
2016 345
Guinea 2005 223 3
2015 150
GuineaBissau 2005 159 6
Guyana 2009 165 2
Honduras 2005 436 5
2009 360
2015 332
Hungary 2007 291 5
2011 310
India 2013 9281 3
Indonesia 2008 1444 3
2014 1320
Iraq 2010 756 5
Israel 2012 483 3
Jamaica 2009 376 4
Jordan 2012 573 1
2017 11
2018 590
Kazakhstan 2007 544 2
2011 600
2018 1446






















Lebanon 2012 561 4
2017 4
2018 528
Lesotho 2015 150 3
Continued on next page
Table A1 –continued from previous page
Country Year # firms # leaders
Liberia 2016 151 3





Madagascar 2007 445 5
2012 532
Malawi 2013 523 4
Malaysia 2014 1000 3
Mali 2006 490 4
2009 360
2015 185
Mauritania 2005 237 4
2013 150
Mexico 2005 1480 3
2009 1480












Morocco 2012 407 1
2018 1096
Mozambique 2006 479 3
2017 494
2018 107
Myanmar 2012 632 3
2015 198
2016 409
Namibia 2005 329 2
2013 580
Nepal 2008 368 6
2012 482
Nicaragua 2005 478 3
2009 336
2016 333
Niger 2016 151 3
Nigeria 2006 1891 3
2013 2676




Pakistan 2012 1247 3
Continued on next page
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Table A1 –continued from previous page
Country Year # firms # leaders
Panama 2005 604 4
2009 365
PapuaNewGuinea 2014 65 4
Paraguay 2005 613 5
2009 361
2016 364





Philippines 2008 1326 2
2014 1335
Poland 2007 455 4
2011 542
2018 1369
Romania 2007 541 4
2011 540




Rwanda 2005 212 1
2018 134
2019 226
Senegal 2006 506 2
2013 601




Sierra Leone 2016 152 2










Solomon Islands 2014 151 8
SouthAfrica 2006 937 2
Southsudan 2013 738 1
SriLanka 2010 610 2
Sudan 2013 662 1
Suriname 2009 152 2
2017 228
2018 5
Sweden 2013 600 3
Tajikistan 2007 360 1
Continued on next page
Table A1 –concluded from previous page
Country Year # firms # leaders
2011 359
2018 352
Tanzania 2005 419 2
2012 813
Thailand 2015 1000 5
Timor-Leste 2014 126 4
Togo 2015 150 2
TrinidadandTobago 2009 370 2
Tunisia 2012 592 2





Uganda 2005 563 1
2012 762









Uzbekistan 2007 366 2
2011 390
2018 1239
Venezuela 2009 320 2
Vietnam 2008 1053 2
2014 996
Yemen 2009 477 2
2012 353





Zimbabwe 2015 540 1
2016 60
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Table A2: Summary Statistics of Geocoded Sample
N Mean Std. Dev. p5 p95
Treated area 99965 .19 .39 0 1
Treated region 99965 .16 .37 0 1
0-2 years before treatment 99965 .02 .16 0 0
0-2 year after treatment 99965 .03 .17 0 0
Total sales in 2009 USD 86361 6869380 58078514 12259 22468666
Num. full-time employees 99081 78 217 5 310
Output per employee in 2009 USD 85963 104490 1561689 1185 257811
Wage in 2009 USD 82023 7423 54011 201 23359
TFP residual 71427 -.01 1.34 -1.79 2.33
Log cost of input factors 86677 15.89 3.38 10.8 21.58
Log value machinery/land/buildings 83595 7.21 8.29 0 20.21
Firm age 98676 18.65 15.36 3 48
Firm % owned private foreign 98666 6.84 23.35 0 85
Firm % owned public 98711 .65 6.47 0 0
Average of all constraints 80509 31.64 20.49 1.67 68.33
Infrastructure constraints 97277 33.84 28.16 0 87.5
Institutional constraints 84227 30.32 22.65 0 70
Input constraints 93761 30.19 23.04 0 75
Obstacle land 96199 24.5 31.43 0 100
Obstacle finance 97983 34.15 31.98 0 100
Obstacle inadequately educated workforce 98430 31.86 31.24 0 100
Attempted or secured government contract? 96976 .18 .38 0 1
Firm directly/indirectly exports? 98443 .24 .43 0 1
New product/service over the last 3 years? 93843 .36 .48 0 1
New/improved process over the last 3 years? 92180 .36 .48 0 1
Any informal payments made? 99965 .29 .46 0 1
Polity2 score 97590 4.14 5.68 -7 10
Estimate for control of corruption 99071 -.47 .61 -1.25 .75
Leader tenure in years 99965 7.63 7.24 1 25
Table A3: Spatial versus Regional Treatment Effects
VARIABLES Log Log Log Log Log Output TFP
Sales Sales Employees Wage per Worker Residual
Treated area in leader 0.3165*** 0.2246*** 0.1516** 0.0939** 0.0917*** 0.0561***
admin region (0.0890) (0.0799) (0.0614) (0.0464) (0.0177) (0.0169)
Treated area not in leader 0.0097 0.1277 0.0531 0.0827 0.1253* -0.0199
admin region (0.0901) (0.0847) (0.0795) (0.0512) (0.0744) (0.1115)
Firm Age 0.0251*** 0.0192*** 0.0030*** 0.0049*** 0.0067***
(0.0021) (0.0013) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0007)
% owned foreign 0.0171*** 0.0102*** 0.0038*** 0.0065*** 0.0050***
(0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004)
% owned government 0.0174*** 0.0153*** -0.0001 0.0016 0.0048***
(0.0042) (0.0029) (0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0015)
Constant 17.0141*** 16.4137*** 2.8091*** 11.6471*** 13.5839*** -0.1286***
(0.0182) (0.0429) (0.0273) (0.0166) (0.0203) (0.0165)
Observations 70,177 70,177 79,718 66,262 69,524 57,840
R-squared 0.6369 0.6660 0.2582 0.8286 0.7796 0.2995
F 7.190 105.0 123.9 26.70 36.28 722.5
Notes : Regressions are estimated using equation 1. In this specification we use an
interaction of the spatial and regional definition of treatment. Dependent variables are
specified in logarithms. All regressions include fixed effects for leader circles, regions,
industries and country-by-years. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the level of
country-sector-year and leader area.
Table A4: Treatment Effects by Institutional Setting
VARIABLES Log Log Log Log
Sales Sales Sales Sales
Treated area -0.1332 0.3030 0.2129*** 0.2098





Treated#Control of Corruption -0.1032 -0.1076
(0.1180) (0.2100)
Treated#Control of Corruption squared 0.0073
(0.1777)
Firm age 0.0248*** 0.0248*** 0.0250*** 0.0250***
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)
% owned foreign 0.0174*** 0.0174*** 0.0170*** 0.0170***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
% owned public 0.0172*** 0.0172*** 0.0173*** 0.0173***
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042)
Constant 16.4683*** 16.4577*** 16.4156*** 16.4152***
(0.0543) (0.0762) (0.0434) (0.0445)
Observations 68,375 68,375 69,422 69,422
R-squared 0.6633 0.6633 0.6671 0.6671
F 119.4 99.50 103.2 88.24
Notes : Regressions are estimated using equation 1. All regressions include fixed effects for
leader circles, regions, industries and country-by-years. Standard errors are two-way
clustered at the level of country-sector-year and leader area.
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